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NOTE
AMOS V. COMMISSIONER: THE AMBIGUOUS AND
EVER-CHANGING DEFINITION OF WHAT
CONSTITUTES A PERSONAL PHYSICAL INJURY
UNDER INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION
104(A)(2)
Benjamin T. Cory1
I. INTRODUCTION
To ensure that a client benefits from a § 104(a)(2) exclusion,
attorneys must assess possible tax treatment from the moment
they begin documenting a case.2 The two most important
documents in determining whether a recovery is "on account of
personal physical injuries," and thus may be excluded under §
104(a)(2) are: 1) the settlement agreement; and 2) the
complaint. 3 To qualify for a § 104(a)(2) exclusion from gross
income, it is critical that an attorney understand what
constitutes a personal injury under this provision, and how to
1. J.D. anticipated May 2005, The University of Montana School of Law. I would
like to acknowledge my grandmother Jeanne Tinnemann Cory, who was my inspiration
in attending law school, and thank my wife Kris, who through her support has provided
me with the time and energy to engage in endeavors such as this.
2. See ROBERT W. WOOD, TAXATION OF DAMAGE AWARDS AND SETTLEMENT
PAYMENTS § 5.1 (2d ed. 1998).
3. See id. at §§ 5.21, 5.23.
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draft the complaint and settlement agreement to ensure §
104(a)(2) will apply.
Since its enactment in 1919, neither the text nor the
legislative history of § 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code
has adequately defined the term "personal injuries."4 While it is
clear that § 104(a)(2) excludes "the amount of any damages
received on account of personal physical injuries or physical
sickness" from gross income, 5 deciphering what constitutes a
"personal physical injury" has remained largely ambiguous. Due
to the vague nature of § 104(a)(2), the courts have had difficulty
limiting the scope of, as well as defining, "personal injuries"
under § 104(a)(2).6
Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code states: "Except
as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all
income from whatever source derived. '7 Any exclusions from
gross income are to be narrowly construed.8 While the §
104(a)(2) exclusion from gross income was originally limited to
damages on account of physical injuries, courts quickly
recognized that nonphysical injuries should also be excludable.9
From 1970 to 1996, § 104(a)(2) was applied to a wide variety of
nonphysical injuries, as well as the economic and non-economic
damages associated with the injury. 10  However, in 1996
Congress substantially limited the scope of § 104(a)(2) when it
amended § 104(a)(2) by requiring that "personal injuries"
suffered be "physical."11
The determination of what constitutes a "personal physical
injury" under § 104(a)(2) is important to general practitioners
and tax specialists. If a particular judgment or settlement is
fully taxable to a plaintiff at ordinary income rates, the
economic result of the litigation is far less beneficial than if the
4. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 234 (1992).
5. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2000).
6. See Threlkeld v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir.
1988); Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992); Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995). These cases,
and the different tests each court used to determine whether a § 104(a)(2) exclusion is
available will be discussed in detail later in this note.
7. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2000).
8. Burke, 504 U.S. at 248 (citations omitted).
9. See Hawkins v. Comm'r, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927).
10. See J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Getting Physical: Excluding Personal
Injury Awards Under the New Section 104(a)(2), 58 MoNT. L. REV. 167 (1997).
11. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat.
1755, 1838-39 § 1605(a).
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same award is excludable. 12 Unfortunately, both attorneys and
their clients often focus on other aspects of a case and may
overlook tax planning.
This note focuses on the physical injury requirement of §
104(a)(2), and the proposition that the definition of "physical
injury" and whether damages were received "on account of'
personal physical injuries may depend largely upon how a case
is presented. Part II of this note provides an overview of the
case law and legislative history of § 104(a)(2). Part III explains
the facts, holding, and reasoning of Amos v. Commissioner.
13
Part IV examines the implications of the personal injury
standard used in Amos, and the importance of demonstrating
that damages received are "on account of' personal physical
injuries. Part V of the note analyzes the practical implications
of Amos, as well as the importance of drafting a settlement
agreement properly in order to justify a § 104(a)(2) exclusion.
Part VI discusses the need for change and the arbitrary
standard developed in response to the insertion of the word
"physical" into the personal injury requirement
II. RELEVANT CASE LAW AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION
104(A)(2)
A. Case Law
Because neither I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) nor the regulations define
or interpret what constitutes a personal injury, the courts have
been forced to determine what type of injuries qualify for a §
104(a)(2) exclusion. Many of the early cases interpreting the
scope of injuries included in § 104(a)(2) provided a broad
definition of injuries qualifying for § 104(a)(2) treatment. 14
Then, beginning with Threlkeld v. Commissioner,'5 which held a
"personal injury" included "any invasion of the rights that an
individual is granted by virtue of being a person in the sight of
the law,"'16 § 104(a)(2) began to be applied more broadly. 17
12. See WOOD, supra note 2, § 1.11.
13. T.C. Memo. 2003-329.
14. See Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. at 1025 (holding that both physical and nonphysical
injuries were within the scope of § 104(a)(2)); and Seay v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 32, 40 (1972)
(defamation of personal reputation constituted a personal injury under § 104(a)(2)).
15. 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), a//'d, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
16. Id. at 1308.
17. See Bent v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 236 (1986), aff'd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987)
2492005
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Following Threlkeld, the essential element necessary to qualify
for a § 104(a)(2) exclusion was that the income involved must
have been derived from the establishment of an invasion of any
personal right.' 8 The United States Supreme Court modified
this standard in United States v. Burke,19 requiring that for
damages to be excludable under § 104(a)(2), they must be "based
upon tort or tort-type rights. ' 20
In 1995, however, the United States Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Schleier2' significantly narrowed the scope of
excludable damages. In Schleier, the Court was asked to
determine whether back pay and liquidated damages received
under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act constituted
damages received on account of a personal injury.22 The Schleier
Court held that two independent requirements must be met by a
taxpayer before a § 104(a)(2) exclusion applies. 23  Under
Schleier, a taxpayer must first "demonstrate that the underlying
cause of action giving rise to the recovery is 'based upon tort or
tort type rights'; and second, the taxpayer must show that the
damages were received 'on account of personal injuries or
sickness.' 24
The "on account of' test as interpreted by Schleier requires
a showing of a nexus between damages and the personal injury.
The Schleier Court provided a helpful hypothetical
demonstrating the application of this nexus or causal
relationship requirement. 25 The Schleier Court's hypothetical
indicates that in addition to damages intended as compensation
(holding that the denial of an individual's First Amendment rights qualified as a
personal injury); Metzger v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 834 (1987), affl'd, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir.
1988) (holding that personal injuries included discrimination on the basis of sex, race or
national origin); and Byrne v. Comm'r, 883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that
personal injuries may include termination from employment).
18. Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1305 (citations omitted).
19. 504 U.S. 229 (1992). In Burke, employees of the Tennessee Valley Authority
brought an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging illegal sex
discrimination. The Court concluded that the damages received by the employees were
not tort-like personal injuries because of the limited nature of damages afforded under
Title VII. The Court stressed that in determining if a tort-like personal injury exists, it
is important that a broad array of damages are available to compensate the plaintiff.
20. Id. at 234. The language used by the Court can be found in 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-
1(c) (2004), which specifically links "personal injury" to damages "based on tort or tort-
type rights."
21. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
22. Id. at 324-25.
23. Id. at 337 (citations omitted).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 329.
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for the personal injury itself (pain and suffering and medical
expenses), damages for economic losses that are causally linked
to the personal injury may also be excluded from gross income. 26
For example, if an individual suffers a physical injury in a car
crash and subsequently is forced to miss work on account of the
physical injuries suffered, damages recovered for lost wages may
be excluded under § 104(a)(2). 27  Thus, the Schleier Court
recognized that as long as a sufficient nexus is established, a
broad range of damages may be excludable under § 104(a)(2). 28
As a result of the Schleier standard, attorneys who wish their
clients to benefit from § 104(a)(2) exclusion should pay careful
attention to demonstrate in both the complaint and the
settlement agreement that any damages awarded are "on
account" of the personal injuries.
B. Legislative History and Historical Perspective of the IRS
Damages received on account of personal injuries may be
excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2). 29 The rationale
for this exclusion is that an individual should not be subject to
taxation on money damages intended to make the taxpayer
whole from personal injuries. While the purpose of § 104(a)(2) is
fairly clear, its application has proved to be much more
complicated.
The legislative history of § 104(a)(2) offers little explanation
of the term "personal injuries. '30 In 1960, however, the IRS
promulgated regulations that "formally linked identification of a
personal injury for purposes of § 104(a)(2) to traditional tort
principles. '31 Relying on a broad definition of "personal injury,"
many rulings and court decisions during the 1970's and 1980's
allowed exclusion for damages arising from both physical and
non-physical personal injuries. 32 In 1989, Congress went so far
as to reject a bill which would have limited § 104(a)(2)
26. Id.
27. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 329-30 (citing Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1300).
28. Id. at 337.
29. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2000).
30. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 234 (1992).
31. See id. and 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (2004).
32. See Rev. Rul. 85-98, 1985-2 C.B.. 51 (a § 104(a)(2) exclusion does not make a
distinction between physical or emotional injuries); Seay v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 32 (1972),
acq., 1972-2 C.B. 3 (allowing embarrassment, mental strain, and injury to personal
reputation to be excluded under § 104(a)(2)).
2005
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exclusions to physical injuries or physical sickness. 33  In
rejecting such a bill it would appear that Congress
acknowledged that § 104(a)(2) was not limited solely to damages
awarded on account of physical injuries or sickness.
However, in 1996 Congress reversed its position and
amended § 104(a)(2) to require that the "personal injury"
suffered be a "personal physical injury" in order to qualify for a §
104(a)(2) exclusion.34  In addition, the 1996 amendments
provided that punitive damages were no longer excludable, even
when received in connection with a physical injury.35  In
addition to requiring the "personal injury" suffered be "physical,"
the statute specifically provided that "emotional distress shall
not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness. '36 The
Conference Committee Report makes clear that emotional
distress may also include physical symptoms such as insomnia,
headaches, or stomach disorders.37
While the 1996 amendments clearly state that § 104(a)(2)
only applies to "physical injuries," the amendments did not
adequately define what types of injuries qualified as "physical."
Just as "personal injury" was never defined, "physical injury"
has also yet to be defined in the regulations. The IRS would
prefer an extremely narrow definition of "physical injury,"
requiring observable harm.38 While some commentators have
argued for a much broader reading of "physical injury," which
would merely require pain resulting from a physical touching,
without the requirement of any observable harm. 39 The key
point is that the term "physical injury" in § 104(a)(2) remains
largely undefined, and it is the responsibility of the attorney to
review the case law and legislative history of § 104(a)(2) and
demonstrate accordingly that a "physical injury" has occurred.
Unfortunately, the guidance currently is sparse in this area.
33. See H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 1354-55 (1989).
34. See 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1996) (emphasis added).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 (1996).
38. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (July 17, 2000) (stating "direct unwanted or
uninvited physical contacts resulting in observable bodily harms such as bruises, cuts,
swelling, and bleeding are personal physical injuries under § 104(a)(2)."). It should be
noted that in this same ruling the IRS refused to decide if a physical contact which does
not manifest in the form of a cut, bruise, or other similar bodily harm would constitute a
"physical injury." Id.
39. See ROBERT W. WOOD, TAXATION OF DAMAGE AWARDS AND SETTLEMENT
PAYMENTS § 2.23 (Supp. 2001).
Vol. 66
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III. AMOs V. COMMISSIONER
A. The Facts
On January 15, 1997, Eugene Amos Jr. (Mr. Amos) was
working as a television cameraman at a basketball game
between the Chicago Bulls and the Minnesota Timberwolves. 40
During the game, Dennis Rodman (Mr. Rodman), a player for
the Chicago Bulls, fell onto a group of photographers, which
included Mr. Amos. 41 At some point during this incident Mr.
Rodman kicked Mr. Amos. 42 Mr. Amos was then taken by
ambulance to a local hospital. 43
Mr. Amos told hospital personnel that he had experienced
shooting pain to his neck immediately after being kicked in the
groin. 44 Mr. Amos also reported that this pain was subsiding.45
Mr. Amos was able to walk, though he was limping and
complained of pain.46  However, medical personnel at the
hospital did not observe any obvious signs of trauma. 47 Mr.
Amos was offered, but refused additional pain medication. 48
While Mr. Amos was being treated at the hospital, he contacted
an attorney, Gale Pearson, to represent him concerning the
evening's incident. 49 After leaving the hospital, Mr. Amos filed a
police report, in which he claimed Mr. Rodman had assaulted
him.50
40. Amos, T.C. Memo. 2003-329 [71 5]. [Editors Note: The Montana Law Review
has adopted legal citation as specified by THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF
CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 17th ed. 2000). However, this note
contains multiple citations to the Amos Tax Court Memorandum, which contains no page
or paragraph numbering to aid the reader in locating the author's sources. To aid the
reader, the editor, in collaboration with the author, has adopted a convention for
pinpoint citation of Amos as suggested by ASSN LEGAL WRITING DIRS. & DARBY
DICKENSON, ALWD CITATION MANUAL § 6.3 (2000). Under this convention, unnumbered
paragraphs in Amos will be indicated by a paragraph symbol and paragraph number in
brackets to illustrate the information has been added by the author and does not appear
in the original source.]
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. [1 6].
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Amos, T.C. Memo. 2003-329 [ 6].
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. [17 ].
50. Id. [1 8].
7
Cory: Amos v. Commissioner
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2005
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
On January 16, 1997, Mr. Amos obtained further treatment
at another hospital.5' Mr. Amos complained to medical
personnel about pain in his groin area, but did not advise them
of any specific symptoms related to his groin pain.52  The
medical personnel determined that there was no swelling of Mr.
Amos' groin, but were unable to ascertain if Mr. Amos had any
bruising.53 Mr. Amos was given some pain medication and told
to continue taking his other prescribed medications.
54
Shortly after the incident, an attorney representing Mr.
Rodman contacted Mr. Amos' attorney.55 They met several
times, including one meeting in which Mr. Rodman's attorney
noticed that Mr. Amos was limping. 56 On January 21, 1997, Mr.
Rodman and Mr. Amos executed a "Confidential Settlement
Agreement and Release" (agreement).57 The agreement stated
that Mr. Amos would release Mr. Rodman from any claims
sustained by Mr. Amos arising out of or in connection with the
incident that occurred between Mr. Rodman and Mr. Amos at
the January 15, 1997 basketball game. 58  The agreement
provided that as consideration for this release, Mr. Rodman
would pay Mr. Amos $200,000.59
The agreement noted in the first paragraph that the release
included claims, demands or actions "concerning any physical,
mental or emotional injuries that may arise in the future
allegedly resulting from the Incident."60  The agreement also
specifically noted that part of the consideration was given to
prevent Mr. Amos from defaming Mr. Rodman, to keep the
terms of the agreement confidential, and for Mr. Amos
promising not to pursue criminal action against Mr. Rodman.
61
The agreement also provided that Mr. Amos was not to publicize
facts relating to the incident, though the agreement did not
specifically mention that consideration was given in exchange
51. Id. [I 9].
52. Amos, T.C. Memo. 2003-329 [1 9].
53. Id.
54. Id. At the time of the incident, Mr. Amos was already taking pain medication
for an unrelated, pre-existing back condition.
55. Id. [1 10].
56. Id.
57. Id. [ U 11].
58. Amos, T.C. Memo. 2003-329 [$ 11].
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
Vol. 66254
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for this promise. 62
When Mr. Amos filed his tax return for the taxable year
1997, he excluded from his gross income all of the $200,000 he
received from Mr. Rodman under the agreement. 63  The
Commissioner of the IRS then notified Mr. Amos that he was not
entitled to exclude the settlement from his gross income.64
B. Holding
The Tax Court found that despite the fact that Mr. Amos
had only suffered minimal injury, Mr. Rodman's dominant
reason for paying the settlement was to compensate Mr. Amos
for physical injuries relating to the incident. 65 However, the Tax
Court also found that Mr. Rodman paid Mr. Amos a portion of
the settlement in return for Mr. Amos agreeing not to: "(1)
Defame Mr. Rodman, (2) disclose the existence or the terms of
the settlement agreement, (3) publicize facts relating to the
incident, or (4) assist in any criminal prosecution against Mr.
Rodman with respect to the incident."66 The Tax Court also held
that the settlement agreement did not specify the portion of
damages paid on account of Mr. Amos' physical injuries and the
portion paid on account of nonphysical injuries. 67 The Tax Court
determined that $120,000 of the settlement amount was
attributable to Mr. Amos' physical injuries and $80,000 of the
settlement was attributable to nonphysical injuries.6 8 As such,
the Tax Court held that $120,000 of Mr. Amos' injuries could be
excluded under § 104(a)(2), but the remaining $80,000 had to be
included as gross income under § 61(a).69
C. Reasoning
The Tax Court began its analysis of Mr. Amos' position by
relying on the premise announced in Welch v. Helvering,70 that
the taxpayer "bears the burden of proving that the
determination in the notice to include the settlement amount at
62. Id.
63. Id. [ 12].
64. Amos, T.C. Memo. 2003-329 [1 13].
65. Id. [ 1 25].
66. Id. [1 27].
67. Id. [ 28].
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
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issue in petitioner's gross income is erroneous."71 The Tax Court
then acknowledged the rule established in Schleier, establishing
that before a recovery may be excluded under § 104(a)(2) a
taxpayer must demonstrate that the recovery was based on tort
or tort type rights, and that the damages were received on
account of physical injuries or sickness. 72 The Tax Court also
reasoned that subsequent to the 1996 Congressional
amendments, § 104(a)(2) requires that "in order to be excluded
from gross income, any amounts received must be on account of
personal injuries that are physical or sickness that is physical. '73
Following its analysis of the general requirements of §
104(a)(2), the Tax Court then analyzed the affect of the
settlement agreement upon a taxpayer's ability to qualify for a §
104(a)(2) exclusion. The Tax Court began its analysis with the
general rule that, where damages are received pursuant to a
settlement agreement, the nature of the claim controls whether
damages may be excluded. 74 The Tax Court noted that, where a
settlement agreement lacks express language allocating the
settlement, the intent of the payor is critical to determining the
allocation of damages. 75 The Tax Court reasoned that "the
character of the settlement payment hinges ultimately on the
dominant reason of the payor in making the payment. 76
The Tax Court then concluded Mr. Rodman's dominant
reason for paying the settlement was to compensate Mr. Amos
for his physical injuries.77 The Tax Court based its reasoning
upon a combination of factors, including the settlement
agreement, a statement from Mr. Rodman, and a statement
from Mr. Amos' attorney. The settlement agreement expressly
provided that Mr. Rodman's payment was in exchange for a
release from any claims that Mr. Amos might have by reason of
any damages or injuries sustained as a result of the incident. 78
Mr. Rodman's statement specifically stated that he entered into
the agreement "to resolve any potential claims. '79
71. Amos, T.C. Memo. 2003-329 [ T 14] (citing Welch, 290 U.S. at 115).
72. Id. [I1 18] (citing Schleier, 515 U.S. at 336-37).
73. Id. [ 19] (citing Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1839-39 (1996)).
74. Id. [if 20] (citing Burke, 540 U.S. at 237).
75. Id. (citing Knuckles v. Comm'r, 349 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1965)).
76. Amos, T.C. Memo. 2003-329 [I 20] (citing Agar v. Comm'r, 290 F.2d 283 (2d
Cir. 1961)).
77. Id. [T 25].
78. Id. [I 26].
79. Id.
256 Vol. 66
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The Tax Court concluded that Mr. Amos' only potential
claims were for physical injuries he claimed he suffered as a
result of the incident at the basketball game.80 In his statement,
Mr. Amos' attorney contended the entire settlement was on
account of Mr. Amos' physical injuries. 81 The Tax Court found
that Mr. Rodman's dominant reason for entering into the
settlement agreement was to compensate Mr. Amos for physical
injuries. 82 However, it should be noted that the Tax Court never
discussed why Mr. Amos' injuries qualified as physical injuries
under § 104(a)(2).
The Tax Court went on to state that because the settlement
agreement specifically mentioned consideration was also given
for nonphysical injuries, a portion of the settlement must be
allocated to those damages as well.8 3 Because the settlement
agreement did not specify the apportionment of the settlement,
the Tax Court reasoned that it should apportion the settlement
between physical and nonphysical injuries based upon a review
of the entire record.84 The Tax Court determined that $80,000 of
the settlement agreement was attributable to nonphysical
injuries, and thus that portion of the settlement could not be
excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2). 85
IV. CHANGES TO THE DEFINITION OF "PHYSICAL INJURY" UNDER
SECTION 104(A)(2) AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE "ON ACCOUNT
OF" STANDARD
Based upon Tax Court's reasoning in Amos, it would appear
that the scope of what constitutes a "physical injury" under §
104(a)(2) may be broader than the limited definition advocated
by the IRS. In accordance with Amos, it can be argued that the
minimum requirements of § 104(a)(2) are that an individual
must experience (1) a physical touching, and (2) that as a result
of the touching the individual experiences pain. The Tax Court
in Amos did not require that Mr. Amos satisfy the strict
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Amos, T.C. Memo 2003-329 [ 26].
83. Id. [ 27]. The Tax Court noted that the settlement agreement also provided
that a portion of the consideration given was to: (1) prevent defamation, (2) prevent
disclosure of the existence or terms of the settlement, (3) prevent publicizing facts
relating to the incident, and (4) to prevent Mr. Amos from assisting in any criminal
prosecution of Mr. Rodman. Id.
84. Id. [ 28].
85. Id.
2005 257
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standard of the IRS requiring an observable injury, such as a cut
or bruise, in order for an injury to be classified as physical. In
contrast, the record in Amos is clear that upon Mr. Amos' arrival
at the hospital medical personnel did not observe any obvious
signs of trauma, bruising or swelling.86
The only objective data observed regarding Mr. Amos'
condition was that he walked with a limp.8 7 Upon arriving at
the hospital, Mr. Amos complained of pain, yet refused the pain
medications offered to him.8 8 The following day Mr. Amos
sought further treatment at a different hospital.8 9 The medical
personnel at the second hospital determined that there was no
swelling of Mr. Amos' groin, and they were unable to ascertain if
Mr. Amos had any bruising. 90
Despite the fact that Mr. Amos had no observable injury, as
defined by the IRS in its ruling, the Tax Court concluded that
Mr. Amos had suffered a physical injury. 91 Mr. Amos did not
have any cuts, bruises, swelling or bleeding, as the IRS has
argued are necessary to constitute a "physical injury."92 The
only facts available in the record indicating a "physical harm"
are that Mr. Amos was subjected to physical contact with Mr.
Rodman and that he complained of pain caused by that contact.
While Mr. Amos did go to the hospital following the incident,
there is no evidence in the record that he suffered any cuts,
bruises, swelling or bleeding. Based on the holding in Amos, it
is clear that at least the tax court will not require observable
harm for an injury to qualify as "physical" under § 104(a)(2).
In determining whether § 104(a)(2) was applicable, the Tax
Court focused extensively on whether the damages Mr. Amos
received were "on account of' physical injury. The Tax Court
concluded that despite the fact that Mr. Amos' damages based
upon his physical injuries may have been nominal, in this case
$1, "it is the nature and character of the claim settled, and not
its validity, that determines whether the settlement payment
can be excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2)." 93 This
holding suggests the importance of emphasizing during the
86. Id. [1 61.
87. Id.
88. Amos, T.C. Memo 2003-329 [1 6].
89. Id. 11191.
90. Id.
91. Id. [ 25].
92. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (July 17, 2000), supra note 38.
93. Amos, T.C. Memo. 2003-329 [71 22-23].
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litigation process that a client's injuries were received "on
account of' personal physical injuries, even when the injury may
be minor. Based upon Amos, it is clear that in demonstrating
that injuries suffered are "on account of' personal injuries, one
need only prove nominal damages to receive the benefits of §
104(a)(2).
V. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF AMOS UPON DOCUMENTING A
CASE IN A MANNER THAT WILL QUALIFY FOR SECTION 104(A)(2)
EXCLUSION
A. Importance of the Underlying Claim and Establishing a
Physical Injury
The tax result regarding § 104(a)(2) treatment of a
particular settlement award or judgment will be determined by
reference to the underlying claim of the lawsuit.94  The
determination of whether a settlement payment may be
excluded from gross income depends on the nature of the claim
asserted, not the validity of the claim.95  Of particular
importance in making this determination is the language of the
settlement agreement and the complaint. 96 Many courts will
reference the settlement agreement itself in determining the
purpose for which a payment was made.97
94. See WOOD, supra note 2, § 1.3.
95. Bent, 87 T.C. 236, 244 (1986), aff'd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987).
96. See McKay v. Comm'r, 102 T.C. 465 (1994), vacated, 84 F.3d 433 (5th Cir.
1996) (unpublished table decision). In McKay, an individual brought suit against his
former employer alleging wrongful discharge, breach of contract and a RICO claim. Id.
at 470. Following a jury award in favor of the employee, the parties entered into a
settlement agreement. Id. at 471. The settlement agreement provided a lump sum of
$25 million, with approximately $9 million of that amount going to the employee's
attorney. Id. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, $12,250,215 was paid in
extinguishment of the wrongful discharge tort claim, and $2,044,085 was paid in
extinguishment of the breach of contract claim. Id. at 472. This allocation was based
upon the probable success of each claim on appeal. Id. Because the $12,250,215 award
for the wrongful discharge was based upon tort-type rights (a physical injury was not
required when the case was decided), the parties agreed that this amount should be
excluded from the employee's gross income under § 104(a)(2). Id. In determining
whether the portion of the settlement allocated to the wrongful discharge could be
excluded, the Tax Court looked first to the express language of the settlement
agreement. Id. at 482. The Tax Court also noted that in the absence of express
allocation within the settlement agreement, courts should consider pleadings, jury
awards or judgments in determining the basis of a claim for § 104(a)(2) purposes. Id. at
483.
97. See Knuckles, 349 F.2d 610. In Knuckles, the Court noted that the most
important factor in determining if a settlement payment was made on account of a
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In determining the purpose of the payment, the Tax Court
in Amos was forced to look at the settlement agreement as a
whole, as well as Mr. Rodman's intent. Fortunately for Mr.
Amos, as well as the attorney who drafted the agreement, the
Tax Court found that Mr. Rodman's dominant purpose in
entering into the settlement agreement was to compensate Mr.
Amos for the physical injuries he suffered at the basketball
game. At the same time, the Tax Court held that a large portion
of the settlement agreement was not awarded on account of
physical injuries, and as a result Mr. Amos did not receive the
benefit of § 104(a)(2) for that portion of the settlement. The
Amos case provides an excellent example of the importance of
considering the requirements of § 104(a)(2) when drafting a
settlement agreement.
B. Allocating the Settlement
Because of the ambiguity of what constitutes a physical
injury under § 104(a)(2), it is critical that attorneys who wish to
obtain the benefit of § 104(a)(2) exclusion for their clients outline
in both the initial complaint and the settlement agreement that
the damages sought or recovered are on account of physical
injuries. However, because courts look skeptically upon
settlement agreements that are not reached as the result of
arms-length, adversarial settlement negotiations, attorneys
must assure that the allocation is more than mere window
dressing.98  When drafting the settlement agreement, the
attorney should be careful to specifically allocate the portions of
the settlement that are attributable to physical injuries and
those which are attributable to nonphysical injuries. If the
settlement agreement fails to specifically allocate the damages
awarded, courts are likely to do as the Amos court and make the
personal injury, is the express language of the settlement agreement. Id. at 613. In the
absence of express language allocating the settlement, courts will look to the intent of
the payor as to the purpose of making the payment. Id. Leaving this determination to
the courts can be a dangerous proposition for taxpayers, as it was for the taxpayer in
Knuckles, where the court ultimately determined that the settlement award was not on
account of personal injuries. Id.
98. Compare Robinson v. Comm'r, 102 T.C. 116 (1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
and remanded on another issue, 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that because the
settlement agreement was not made at arms-length, and through an adversarial
negotiation process, the Court was not required to follow the allocation outlined by the
settlement agreement need not be followed), with McKay, 102 T.C. at 465 (upholding
the allocation of damages as outlined by the settlement agreement because the
negotiations were arms-length and adversarial in nature).
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determination on their own. While courts are not bound to
accept the allocation of damages established in a settlement
agreement, it is in a party's best interest to specifically allocate
damages between physical and nonphysical injuries, so as not to
risk the chance that a court will determine that the damages
awarded are not on account of physical injuries.
VI. THE NEED FOR CHANGE
By inserting the word "physical" into § 104(a)(2) Congress
created an arbitrary and ambiguous standard. As early as 1926
courts began applying § 104(a)(2) to both physical and
nonphysical injuries. 99 For many years the focus of whether a
damage award received § 104(a)(2) treatment was based upon a
determination of whether the claim sounded in tort.100 By
allowing a broad interpretation of "personal injury," courts were
not forced to play the role of scientists and draw arbitrary lines
for determining whether a victim of a personal injury should be
afforded the benefits of § 104(a)(2). Prior to the insertion of the
word "physical," courts were simply asked to determine (1)
whether the individuals claim was based upon tort or tort-type
rights and (2) whether the damages received were on account of
personal injuries.
Under the pre-1996 system, an individual who suffered
severe emotional distress and underwent years of expensive
therapy or even lost her job as a result of a tort-type injury was
afforded the benefit of § 104(a)(2) exclusion for damages
recovered. Under current § 104(a)(2), that same severely injured
individual would be taxed upon that damage award simply
because there was no evidence of a physical injury, such as a
bruise or cut. To continue to apply § 104(a)(2) solely to "physical
injuries" completely ignores the well established fact that
psychological injuries can be at least as detrimental to an
individual as physical injuries and that psychological injuries
have a significant physical dimension. Not only does the current
"personal physical injury" standard arbitrarily prejudice a huge
number of individuals who have suffered real and quantifiable
psychological injuries, but it has forced courts to apply an
ambiguous standard. If, as apparently was the case, Congress
was concerned that the exclusion of damages for non-physical
injuries resulted in an inappropriate exclusion of economic
99. See generally Threlkeld, 87 T.C. 1294.
100. Id. at 1305.
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damages, Congress in 1996 could have simply provided in §
104(a)(2) that economic damages like punitive damages are not
excludable. If this had been the case, there would have been no
need to add the word "physical" to the statute and the current
ambiguity and arbitrary distinctions would have been avoided.
To avoid the ambiguous and arbitrary distinction of § 104(a)(2)
Congress should rectify this problem accordingly.
VII. CONCLUSION
The holding in Amos, indicates that courts will not always
limit § 104(a)(2) exclusion to the narrow definition of "physical
injuries" that the IRS advocates. When determining whether §
104(a)(2) exclusion is appropriate, the tax court appears to be
willing to apply a more lenient standard than the "cutting,
bruising, or swelling" standard of the IRS. Based upon the
holding in Amos, a showing of even minor physical injuries is
sufficient to trigger the application of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion.
It appears that a physical touching accompanied by pain,
suffered as a result of that touching satisfies the "on account of'
standard and will qualify as a "physical injury" under §
104(a)(2).
While what constitutes "damages received on account of
physical injuries" remains ambiguous, it is clear that, for a client
to benefit from § 104(a)(2) exclusion, attorneys must draft their
clients' pleadings and settlement agreements in a manner that
emphasizes the nature and existence of the physical injury.
Ultimately, attorneys should 'be aware of the importance of
demonstrating that damages were awarded "on account of'
personal physical injuries. In doing so, it is the nature and
character of the claim that is important, not its validity.
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